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1. Introduction 
One of the primary features of globalisation has been the growth and spread of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), and their increasing significance in the economies of 
almost all countries, whether large or small, developing or industrialized. MNEs have 
sought to spatially distribute their value-adding activities globally to not only take 
advantage of market opportunities but also to exploit different specialised resources and 
capabilities that are unique to particular locations. In other words, in response to 
increasing cross-border competition and rivalry, firms have increasingly sought to 
organise their activities internationally to achieve greater efficiency in their value-adding 
activities, and thereby optimising their market share and rent generation.  
However, there is considerable evidence that MNEs do not regard all locations as 
being equivalent. Smaller economies, less-developed countries and countries which are 
spatially or economically on the ‘periphery’ are not as attractive as destinations for 
inward FDI because of their limited market size, or other under-developed location 
advantages. As such, the kinds of subsidiaries and the nature of the MNEs’ value-adding 
activities located in more peripheral regions and countries are also different, and tend to 
be considerably less integrated into their global operations. MNEs that originate from 
peripheral economies also behave differently from those emanating from core countries 
when internationalising their operations.  
Not all these differences are associated specifically with the peculiarities of their 
peripheral location. Indeed, it can be argued that some of the differences in the nature, 
motivation, and pace of inward and outward FDI derive primarily from being at an earlier 
stage of economic development. However, the ‘costs of being peripheral’ accrue also to 
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countries which are not necessarily developing. A number of smaller developed countries 
tend to be host to different kinds of MNE affiliates, and MNEs from these countries 
internationalise in decidedly different ways compared to more core countries. There is a 
stream of research that argues that these differences are due to the resource constraints 
associated with small country size (see e.g., the contributions to Van Den Bulcke and 
Verbeke, 2001). Nonetheless, Benito et al. (2002) have shown that even countries of 
similar size, geographic location and economic development still exhibit different extents 
of engagement in international business. As we shall highlight in this chapter, the primary 
differentiating factor between the core and periphery is interdependence, and this is 
determined by the extent of social, political and economic integration, and the extent to 
which there is reciprocity. 
This book also seeks to develop this theme, focusing on how MNE activity both 
to and from peripheral economies differs from MNE activity associated with core 
economies. Much of the literature on international management and business focuses on 
MNEs to and from core economies, or examines the differences as being primarily 
associated with country size. Another literature (associated with development economics) 
argues that economic development is the primary determinant. We argue that these two 
arguments are closely associated, because these locations are similarly handicapped. 
Countries such as Trinidad or South Africa – at least with regards MNE activity – share 
characteristics in common with Norway and Estonia.   
 
 
 
 7
2. What is ‘Peripheral’? 
The concept of a periphery has been with us a long time, and by its very definition, 
implies that it is relative to the existence of a ‘core’. Researchers in the area of ‘world 
systems theory’ have argued that the core-periphery dichotomy (in its current sense) 
amongst nations has been with us since at least the 16th century when the foundations of 
the modern capitalist system and international trade led to the beginning of the process of 
globalisation and the increasing interdependence between nations through trade (see the 
various works of Wallerstein, e.g., 1974, 1979). This body of work is closely linked to 
dependency theory (see e.g., Prebisch, 1962), which building on the core-periphery 
argument addresses the challenges for development and catch-up for the countries in the 
periphery – who are, by definition, economically or otherwise poorer or less 
technologically advanced than countries of the core. These theories focus on political, 
sociological and economic challenges that derive from the domination by the core, of the 
periphery. 
Defining the periphery is a task fraught with difficulty, because membership of 
the core (and of the periphery) changes over time. For the purposes of this contribution, 
we refer to countries that are peripheral (or core) in the sense of economic globalisation. 
We regard globalisation as an ongoing process, rather than an event, which has 
influenced different economic actors to varying extents. Globalisation as used here 
implies the growing interdependence of locations and economic units across countries 
and regions (Narula 2003). The key word here is interdependence. Cross-border linkages 
between economic entities do not imply globalisation, merely internationalisation. 
Integration and interdependence is about reciprocity, and the extent of this reciprocity.  
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The concept of interdependence and reciprocity are crucial to understanding 
globalisation, and by extension, the nature of the core-periphery dichotomy. ‘Simpler’ 
cross-border activity such as trade does not necessarily result in interdependence. It is the 
growth of FDI, and the multinational corporation in the modern, complex cross-border 
hierarchical organizational form that plays a pivotal role in fostering economic 
interdependence. For while international business activity was broad based through trade, 
it was dominated by the development of vertical linkages, with a flow of goods between 
locations, in response to varying elasticities of supply and demand. Raw materials were 
transported from one location to another, manufactured, and transported to a third 
location for sale. Factors of production were immobile, and although capital did in fact 
get relocated, these were capital flows rather than capital embodied in physical assets or 
personnel, and (with a few notable exceptions) there were no significant integration of 
operations in disparate locations within the control and management of the same 
individuals until after WWII. Firms were international, but not multinational. 
International business and economic activity was extensive in the sense that the value of 
goods and capital exchanged were considerable, and involved numerous countries and 
actors, who were all dependent upon each other’s patronage. But it was not intensive, in 
that activities were largely not integrated across borders, with the possible exception of 
the large trading companies and other state-sanctioned de facto monopolies (Held et al., 
1999). 
As with all dichotomies such as the north-south, west-east, rich-poor, etc, there 
are numerous shades of grey between the two extremes, and in general require gross 
simplifications of a continuum of intermediate levels. This is all the more the case with 
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the core-periphery dichotomy, since countries have been integrated into the world 
economy to different extents, and this is continuously in flux, since it is a process. Hence, 
as indicated in Figure 1.1, it is more appropriated to treat core-periphery as a continuum. 
For instance, the last three decades have seen China, and some East Asian economies 
(such as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia) move closer to the core than the periphery, 
than say, Laos, Vietnam, or Bangladesh. Much of Africa is firmly within the periphery 
(and one may even go so far as to say sub-Saharan Africa can be defined as being ‘on the 
periphery of the periphery’), although South Africa has moved towards the core. It is not 
about size, the lack of natural resources or markets. The Netherlands and Belgium are 
small in these terms, but are firmly in the core, whereas Norway, Finland and New 
Zealand are in the periphery, but are at varying distances from the core, in the sense that 
they are less integrated into the world economy. It is not simply about the level of 
industrial or economic development: much of the former Soviet Union (with the possible 
exception of Russia), while industrially developed and of relatively high GDP levels are 
firmly within the periphery, rather than the core. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
It is worth noting that while distance has historically been an important determining 
factor of peripheral-ness, technological improvements in transportation and 
communication technologies have played a significant role in making geographic 
distances less significant, although the costs of transportation of physical goods and 
people remains non-trivial.  
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A peripheral economy can be said to be one which plays an insignificant role as 
either host or home to MNEs; engages in relatively little trade in intermediate and 
manufactured goods; contributes relatively little to innovation and scientific progress; is 
weakly linked or accessible physically to the core, because of poor infrastructure, 
transport and communication links; does not play a significant role in decision making 
within supranational organisations; and does not share a significant number of formal 
institutions with the core countries. Globalisation implies economic, political and social 
integration, in the sense that there is an ongoing relationship that involves reciprocity, 
and creates a longer-term ongoing interdependence between economic actors. Countries 
with limited participation in this global milieu, and for whom reciprocity is ‘unequal’, are 
de facto weakly integrated and hence peripheral to the world economy.  
 
3. Why is it Important to Understand the Periphery? 
There are those who wish to understand why the world evolves into a core-periphery 
formation, taking a more positive (rather than normative) approach. Again, the history of 
economics is littered with such studies, and these go all the way back to include Adam 
Smith, Frederich List, David Ricardo, among others. What makes a particular area, 
region or state into a core location rather than a peripheral one, and vice versa? Indeed, 
this may be argued as being the primary objective of much of the social sciences.  
The core-periphery concept within the field of economics has – for a rather long 
time – been the remit of economic geography, building very much upon the insights of 
Alfred Marshall (1919), and much-divorced from the mainstream literature until Paul 
Krugman ‘re-invented’ what is known as the ‘new economic geography’ in his influential 
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1991 book.  This has spurred a new literature which has embraced the core-periphery 
argument at its centre to answer the question, ‘what might economic integration across 
countries and regions mean for the spatial organization of economic activity? Does it 
increase concentration of economic activity in the core at the expense of the periphery, or 
does it eventually lead to greater dispersion?’ (see e.g., Krugman, 1991; Krugman and 
Venables, 1995; Forslid and Wooton, 2003; Fujita and Thisse 2003). This discussion has 
been couched within the discussion of how globalisation affects economic disparities 
between regions and nations. Indeed, there is now a large literature that asks whether 
globalisation will increase or decrease the polarisation and inequalities between rich and 
poor. 
The important finding in this body of work is this: when there are declining costs 
of transportation and communication, as is associated with globalisation, the resultant 
increased international commerce leads economic activity to re-organise itself between 
the trading regions along a core-periphery structure, to the detriment of economic activity 
in the periphery. That is, there will be a ‘hollowing out’ in the periphery, and an 
agglomeration of activity in the core, because firms will concentrate production where 
demand is greater, and where economies of scale can be gained.  There are important 
nuances in the various models proposed, and differences in opinion as to whether the 
core-periphery model holds as costs decline further with a deepening of globalisation. 
Does the periphery become more peripheral over time, or is there a point at which 
patterns of concentration reverse such that the periphery converges with the core? 
Most of these studies acknowledge the pivotal role of the MNE in shifting 
production (and therefore employment) from one location to another in response to 
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changing prices, availability of factors of production, and the presence of markets. 
However, the way in which production shifts from core to the periphery, the structure of 
global production of MNEs, and the differences between firms from the core and the 
periphery has been a matter which has mainly been addressed by the international 
business literature.  
A number of the early research in international business contrasted the 
internationalisation behaviour of MNEs from the core and the periphery, and how the 
redistribution of production and innovation between the core and the periphery takes 
place. Vernon’s product life cycle model (1966) examines this process, based on a single 
core country (the US), and how, over the life of a given product, production would 
gradually be transferred to increasingly peripheral locations, either by the innovating core 
country firms, or by firms based in peripheral economies1.  
 
4. Outward FDI from the Periphery 
Vernon’s work – as with much of the earlier research on internationalisation of firms and 
the location of production – pays scant attention to the differences in the nature of MNEs 
of differing home countries. Affiliates of MNEs from the core would function abroad as 
‘miniature replicas’ of their home country operations, truncated in response to firm 
specific characteristics and the host country characteristics. Likewise, it was assumed that 
firms from the periphery – as they moved economically towards the level of the core – 
would operate in a similar manner, both at home, and abroad.  
This idea was challenged in response to the growing phenomenon of MNEs from 
the developing countries (see e.g., Lecraw, 1977; Kumar and McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983). 
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As UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2006 attests to, this literature has burgeoned 
quite considerably, and has evolved a lot since the early work in this area. These concepts 
can be broadly applied beyond developing country MNEs to outward FDI from the 
periphery in general. The evidence on MNEs from the periphery has shown an evolution 
over time, and two different types of MNEs from the periphery, best described as being 
of two ‘waves’. Although this two-wave approach was developed explicitly with 
developing country MNEs in mind, the second wave in particular is associated with the 
characteristics of the MNEs, and their motivations apply equally to all peripheral home 
countries, whether developing or industrialised. 
The first wave sketched a description of a ‘different’ kind of MNE that – so it was 
argued – differed considerably from that of ‘conventional’ industrialised country MNEs, 
in terms of its ownership (O) advantages, motivation, geographical direction and mode of 
overseas activity. One of the features of developing country MNE activity as charted in 
the first wave literature was the direction and motivation of FDI, compared with 
‘conventional’ MNEs (see e.g., Lall 1983). Much of the empirical work indicated a 
strong and marked trend for MNE from the periphery to focus their investments in 
neighbouring and other countries at a similar or an earlier stage of development. This 
preference was a direct result of their lack of international experience – these locations 
had offered resource endowments for markets that were broadly similar to those of their 
home countries. Furthermore, their O advantages were of a type most suited to these 
location (L) advantages (and often induced by them), and were based on technologies at 
the end of their product life cycles. In other words, these MNEs had few transaction-type 
ownership (Ot) advantages, and only the most basic form of asset-type O advantages (Oa) 
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– those that derive from the efficient acquisition and adaptation of imported technologies. 
These O advantages were enhanced by the prevalence of import-substituting, inward 
looking policy regimes amongst most developing countries which encouraged small scale 
production, typical of that suited to these MNEs. The O advantages of these firms were 
primarily country-specific, determined by the market distortions introduced by the home 
country policies, and only sustainable where similar L advantages existed in other 
countries. While some asset-seeking investment in industrialised countries was 
undertaken, it was relatively minor with many large investments representing flight 
capital or ‘round-trip investments’, as entrepreneurs utilised overseas subsidiaries to 
circumvent home country restrictions on outbound international capital movements. In 
particular cases, a large proportion of what is statistically recorded as outward FDI flows 
represented investments by the affiliates of ‘conventional’ MNEs.   
The growth of the ‘second wave’ of periphery MNEs can be traced to the late 
1980s, and has also – of recent – been expanded to include the growth of outward FDI 
from the former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The second 
wave MNEs from the periphery tend to come from countries at a higher stage of 
industrial development, or have evolved structurally towards industrial sectors that are 
capital and knowledge intensive. These firms engage in outward FDI to less developed 
countries as a means of moving their natural-asset intensive activities to locations with 
appropriate comparative advantages, while, at the same time, they are engaging in both 
market and strategic asset-seeking FDI towards the core countries. In other words, they 
are increasingly becoming global, demonstrating features of ‘conventional’ MNEs from 
the core.   
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The evolution of the ‘second wave’ MNEs from the periphery has been further 
enhanced by the fundamental (but gradual) change in the structure of the world economy, 
much of which is often generalised as being a direct result of globalisation. These 
changes can be considered from the peripheral country perspective as being of two kinds. 
First, there are those that have been largely exogenous to these countries but which have 
affected their economic structure both as members of the world economic order and as 
individual economies. Whereas most core countries have been experiencing economic, 
technological and structural convergence, the majority of the peripheral countries, rather 
than converge with the lead countries, have tended to diverge. This simultaneous process 
of convergence and divergence has impacted on firms by creating broader and more 
competitive markets across countries due to similar consumption and production patterns. 
This has had two effects on the converging countries: (i) firms in each country are 
presented with larger markets, and this has led to developing global technologies that 
have large economies of scale and high minimum efficient scale. Firms in these industrial 
sectors need international markets to justify production (see Chapter 4 in this volume); 
and (ii) technologies have also converged, such that firms in certain sectors are now 
competing not just with other firms in the same country, but other firms in the same 
country but not necessarily in the same industry. In other words, firms need to have 
competitive advantages that are globally viable, rather than domestically or regionally so, 
and this has been further enhanced by the innovation of space-shrinking technologies 
(Narula and Dunning, 2000). Although the development of de facto and de jure economic 
blocs such as EU and NAFTA has primarily acted to enhance the positive effects of these 
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developments for their members, they also represent barriers to entry to non-members 
and to developing countries in particular. 
 Second, there have been structural changes within individual countries often in 
direct response to these changes, and as such may be considered as endogenous to most 
peripheral economies. These endogenous changes are primarily associated with the 
actions and policies of governments. One of the most important of these changes over the 
past decade or so has been a fundamental shift in the policy orientation of developing 
countries from an import-substituting role (or a centrally-planned one) to an export-
oriented, outward looking one. The extent of liberalisation varies between countries: in 
some cases it is associated with a more pro-active and market facilitating role, while in 
others it is simply reactive or even laissez-faire. Nonetheless, despite this broad spectrum 
of policy options, it is safe to generalise that the extent of government intervention 
embraces a much wider spectrum than was the case prior to 1990, and this variation is 
equally diverse regarding policy orientations towards MNE activity.  
 
Multinationals from the Periphery 
Certainly, the evidence on MNEs from the periphery would indicate that both waves of 
outward FDI from the periphery now occur simultaneously, from the same countries, 
regardless of their stage of economic development. The first wave MNEs are focused 
towards resource-intensive activity (whether extractive, or labour-intensive), while for 
the second wave MNEs their primary markets are in the core countries, and this is 
evidenced by the growth of FDI and there is increasing evidence that they wish to rapidly 
consolidate their presence in these locations. Growing competition means that these 
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nascent MNEs do not have the privilege of slow and gradual overseas expansion any 
longer. A number of these MNEs have expanded through mergers and acquisitions, 
although this phenomenon is much smaller in relative terms than many observers have 
made out (Barnard, 2006). In other cases, they are ‘born global’, although the extent to 
which this is done may have less to do with their origin in a peripheral location than the 
industry-specific characteristics (see Chapter 5 in this volume). Whatever their reasons 
for doing so, a majority of these MNEs seek to present themselves not as MNEs from 
South Africa, India or China, but they adopt the modus operandi of ‘conventional’ MNEs 
from the core countries (Barnard, 2006; Mathews, 2006). Indeed, several of them relocate 
their headquarters to the US or the EU, and/or list themselves on stock markets there.  
Most peripheral economies have – as a means to overcome the inherent 
disadvantages and structural market imperfections associated with their home locations – 
nurtured state-owned enterprises and national champions as part of their economic and 
industrial policies. They have also often provided protection against competition, and 
subsidised their outward expansion. Although various agreements within the WTO 
(combined with economic liberalisation) have led to the dissolution – or at least a 
weakening of such state support – this has helped strengthen their O advantages, and 
provided these firms with the initial impetus to internationalise. However, as rents from 
protected home markets have dried up as a result of increased competition and 
privatisation in a post-liberalisation scenario, a number of such firms have experienced 
considerable restructuring of their foreign operations, sometimes withdrawing completely 
by selling off their foreign assets (Benito, 2005). Others have responded to the challenge 
by expanding abroad rapidly in a more aggressive way, and acting out on commercial 
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opportunities without fear punitive action on the part of their home country governments. 
These issues are discussed in greater detail in the policy section of this chapter. 
 
5. Inward FDI to Peripheral Economies  
The liberalisation of markets and the increasing cross-border interdependence between 
economies as a result of globalisation has also led to a restructuring of inward FDI to 
these countries. The traditional picture of FDI flows has been that of capital, technology 
and competence moving between core countries of the Triad or to more peripheral ones 
within the Triad, with those outside the Triad largely being left out of the equation 
altogether (Dicken, 2003). In 2004, three-quarters of total stock of FDI in the world 
remained concentrated in Europe and North America (UNCTAD, 2005). Even though 
there are several cases of small peripheral countries that have been highly successful in 
attracting FDI – Ireland probably being the prime example in recent times (the value of 
the stock of inward foreign direct investment amounted to 126% of Ireland’s GDP in 
2004, see UNCTAD, 2005) – there is a tendency for FDI to agglomerate in large 
countries, such as The United States, Germany, the UK and, increasingly, China. The 
United States has over time actually strengthened its current position as the largest 
recipient of FDI, closely followed by the EU, which experienced substantial inflows as a 
result of further economic integration throughout the last two decades. Another example 
of how economic integration may promote inward FDI is Mexico, which has become an 
increasingly important host for the operations of MNEs – partly as a result of the 
establishment of NAFTA.    
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The picture has been particularly striking in the case of horizontal FDI, which to a 
considerable extent is of a market-seeking nature. The large markets of the core Triad 
economies have consequently been the main sources of FDI and well as the main 
recipients of such investments. Despite the high purchasing power of individual 
consumers, the reduction of trade costs as a result of trade liberalization should generally 
have made the smaller and more peripheral Triad countries less attractive as destinations 
for horizontal FDI: it has become easier and cheaper to serve these markets through 
exports. 
Vertical FDI, which is motivated by access to inputs and improving 
competitiveness through more efficient production, has historically been less prone to be 
concentrated among the large core countries: for example, before WWII two-thirds of the 
world’s FDI was located in developing countries (Dicken, 2003), and a majority of that 
FDI was of a vertical kind. However, in relative terms developing countries became 
evermore marginalised as host countries in the decades following the WWII. Less than a 
third of the world’s FDI stock in 2000 was located in developing countries. For small, 
peripheral, but rich and developed countries, such as those in the Nordic region, in 
Oceania, and in Western and Southern Europe there has been a continuous flow of 
vertical FDI. Nevertheless, developments have been uneven. For example, whereas 
MNEs industries such as shoes, textiles and apparel, and various consumer goods were 
attracted by low labour costs in Southern Europe in the 1960-1980 period, the cost 
advantage of that part of Europe was gradually lost in subsequent decades and much of 
the manufacturing capacity hence migrated to Asia. Only selected parts of production – 
those in which manufacturers were able to significantly upgrade local skills and 
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competence – remain in the area. Other regions, such as the Nordic countries, also lost 
much of their traditional industrial manufacturing base (some of which was foreign-
owned), but in many industries their relative cost-position did not deteriorate as much 
(see Chapter 9 in this volume); partly due to investments in technology and organisation 
that has brought about significant productivity gains, and partly due to further 
specialisation into areas where their cost position is less threatened. The general high-cost 
position of the Nordic countries has been balanced by the development of good physical, 
social and educational infrastructures, and a well-educated workforce. Highly skilled 
human resources, such as engineers and scientists, have actually been relatively modestly 
paid. Some peripheral countries – and Ireland is a prime example – have been successful 
with pursuing deliberate policy efforts aimed at promoting inward FDI. Credible long-
term policies that included favourable tax schemes and considerable infrastructural 
investment, combined with their position as a gateway to the EU, lead to the creation of 
the Celtic Tiger (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Finally, vertical inward FDI has in many 
instances been motivated by countries’ endowments of natural resources, such as energy 
and mineral, as testified by the presence of many MNEs in Latin America, in South 
Africa, and in Oceania. 
 
MNE affiliates in the periphery 
Acknowledging that FDI is not simply a commodity, but that what foreign-owned 
subsidiaries actually do in a country matters, there is now a rich literature on various 
aspects of subsidiary roles and development (see e.g., Benito et al., 2003; Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998; Holm and Pedersen, 2000). It is useful to look at the combination of activity 
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scope and competence levels when discussing subsidiary roles. Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
different subsidiary roles that unfold from the various combinations of scope and 
competence levels. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Because internationalization is inherently risky, initial investments tend to be small, 
perhaps in a sales subsidiary or a small-scale production unit. Subsequent development 
may, if it occurs, proceed along either one or both dimensions. As shown in Figure 1.2, 
subsidiaries with many activities but low competence levels are defined as ‘miniature 
replicas’ that basically mirror the parent organization. These subsidiaries are typically 
found in areas that are strategic for locating the entire value chain to achieve economies 
of scale and scope. Subsidiaries with few activities but high levels of competence, on the 
other hand, are highly specialised units that add value through their knowledge and 
competence to the rest of the MNE. Such subsidiaries are often related to R&D activities. 
There will, without doubt, always be several different combinations creating a variety of 
roles, as illustrated by multi-activity units. That defines a ‘mid-ground’ of subsidiary 
roles where probably the majority of subsidiaries can be placed. Finally, ‘strategic 
centres’ represent subsidiaries with a wide scope of activities as well as high competence 
levels.  
We expect that it is generally more beneficial – from the viewpoint of subsidiary 
development – to be located in the core than outside it. Units in the larger markets are, 
ceteris paribus, in a better position than those in the periphery to exploit economies of 
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scale as well as economies of scope. Because liberalisation of trade and factor 
movements often results in an intensification of competition, there will usually be a 
shakeout of less-efficient actors (see Chapters 2 and 8 in this volume). Those that remain 
in an industry are hence likely to be the most competitive ones. Of course, competitive 
processes are never at a standstill and units must – regardless of their location – strive to 
better their performance, efficiency or innovativeness. Units in peripheral locations may 
clearly also develop high levels of competence, especially if they are part of strong local 
industrial clusters or if they enjoy favourable access to unique resources of various kinds: 
special circumstances may make particular locations well suited for certain activities. 
However, whenever operations are predominantly oriented towards the local market, 
factors like weaker competition, smaller markets, and more peripheral positions in the 
corporate network of the parent MNE, work against subsidiaries developing more 
advanced roles (see Chapter 8 in this volume). Subsidiaries in peripheral locations with 
the characteristics of, say, ‘strategic centres’ are hence more likely to be the ‘special case’ 
rather than the ‘general case’. 
Countries on the periphery suffer from their smaller markets and distance to the 
core. Historically, they have tended to overcome such disadvantages by instituting 
industrial policies that promote import-substituting type of investments by MNEs. As a 
result, they have tended to host subsidiaries that are ‘miniature replicas’. The MNEs have 
been able and willing to offset the disadvantages associated with small market size and 
inefficient scale economies inter alia by obtaining opportunities associated with 
privileged access to restricted markets.  
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A deep regional integration scheme, of which the EU is a prime example, may 
considerably affect the location advantages associated with peripheral countries. Upon 
membership of deep integration schemes, ‘insider’ peripheral countries experience a 
decline of their location advantages associated with such privileges, since the state must 
re-orient their economies to the supra-regional norms established by the core, which is 
assumed to be offset by an industrial redistribution within the region based on 
comparative advantage, and potential access to a larger unified market. ‘Outsider’ 
countries, on the other hand, experience a decline in their location advantages, not 
because of industrial redistribution, but by virtue of being marginalized relative to 
neighbouring ‘insider’ countries. However, Tavares (Chapter 6 in this volume) shows 
that the development trajectories of ‘insider’ countries – that would seem as relatively 
similar countries at the outset – may well differ. 
 
6. Policy Issues 
There are a number of policy issues which arise, which can be classified as being: (1) 
policy issues associated with the peripheral nature of these economies per se, and (2) 
policy issues associated with the MNEs that invest into and from peripheral economies. 
These are intricately related, and we discuss two different areas of interest: those 
associated with domestic national policies, and those associated with supra-national 
policies.  
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Domestic policy issues  
Peripheral economies tend to be limited in their industrial policy space because of the 
inherent limitations of their economy. As discussed earlier, their economies tend to have 
competitive advantages in just a few sectors, and these tend to be sectors which take 
advantage of their natural assets. We argue here that peripheral economies – which tend 
to be both supply and demand constrained – are increasingly seeking to overcome these 
limitations by aggressively creating interdependencies with the core through rapid 
internationalisation.  This process has been considerably accentuated as countries have 
come to accept the new realities of economic liberalisation that have necessitated an 
outward-looking, pro-FDI, political and economic policy orientation. The end to 
protectionism and state support that went well with the inward-looking import 
substituting stance, coupled with the resultant rapid inflow of FDI from the core 
economies has forced domestic economic actors (both firms and states) to respond by 
looking to aggressively internationalise (Chapter 3 in this volume discusses in some 
detail the interaction between inward FDI and the internationalisation of Estonian firms). 
From a demand perspective, the relatively limited domestic market size meant – 
in the days of inward looking policies – that if such MNEs were to achieve economies of 
scale in production, they sought additional markets to that of their home location in order 
to increase their de facto market size2 (Bellak and Cantwell, 1997). This has not changed, 
except that the imperative is now greater with increased international competition. From 
a supply perspective, the smallness of their economies means that they have limited 
resources, in terms of capital (both financial and human) as well as in terms of natural 
and created assets, such that firms from these countries tend to be specialised in a few 
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sectors. The industrial structure of peripheral economies tends to demonstrate a ‘niche’ 
character, with a high level of specialisation in few areas, where firms act as specialist 
suppliers, and thereby show a low level of product diversification. Bellak and Cantwell 
(1997) posit that it is in such sectors that they can achieve price-setter positions. 
Industrial policy in these countries has often supported this specialisation, because 
governments have a choice between spreading their limited resources thinly across many 
industries or have concentrated them in a few targeted industries. Some governments 
have seen the internationalisation of their firms as a ‘vote of no-confidence’ in their home 
economy, and have actively sought to dissuade them from internationalisation. However, 
a problem for many firms from peripheral economies is that they need inputs that are not 
available locally and which they must therefore seek in foreign locations.   
Policies in the past have tended to involve intervention to micro-manage the 
economy by trying to pick sectors to support, and the creation of national champions. 
However, this option can only be partially successful. It is expensive, and not sustainable 
on the long term, especially as WTO protocols such as the agreement on subsidies and 
countervailing measures (SCM) have reduced this avenue for intervention. Furthermore, 
though, despite the best intentions of governments, they cannot always pick national 
champions who will be ‘winners’ at the technological frontier, because by definition, the 
potential of one technological paradigm over another is very much unpredictable. In 
addition, peripheral country governments have limited resources, and not just financial 
capital. One of the primary reasons firms go abroad is to seek diversity of ideas and 
knowledge. This can hardly be overcome through techno-nationalism (Narula, 2003).  
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The only real option open to policy makers in this era of globalisation is to accept 
the inevitable and help firms overcome market failure in markets for knowledge, as well 
as reduce the inherent risks of internationalisation for their MNEs. This requires a pro-
active industrial policy, which should include allowing for the cross-border flow of new 
ideas through human capital: by far the most cost-effective means of such flows. Most 
important, it provides industry with the means to internalise and absorb technologies and 
ideas acquired from elsewhere, thereby developing a skilled workforce of international 
quality. This entails investing more in the quality of tertiary education and public 
institutions.   
Formal policies on inward FDI have to a large extent been liberalised, although 
considerable differences exist in the extent to which ‘MNE-friendly’ actions are de facto 
implemented. Given the considerable reliance of peripheral economies on FDI as a 
source of capital and technology, the kinds of FDI that are attracted, and the nature of 
MNE subsidiaries’ scope and scale is of prime importance. It is well acknowledged that 
the net benefits from FDI vary, by the kinds of activities undertaken in a given location, 
and that different subsidiaries may have widely different roles, ranging from performing 
relatively simple distribution tasks to having responsibility for a range of activities, 
including research, development, and manufacturing. Although a number of peripheral 
economies play host to strategic subsidiaries, in general, subsidiaries in these economies 
tend to be less well-integrated within the MNE’s hierarchy (see Chapter 8 in this 
volume).  
As Kottaridi (2005) among others has shown, there are non-trivial benefits from 
being in the core rather than being in the periphery, whether in the sense of being 
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peripheral to the core (such as say, Norway), or being peripheral within the periphery 
(such as, say, Laos). It is worth stressing that, except in sectors where there are important 
and dynamic industrial clusters, peripheral countries may experience a decline in MNE 
subsidiary activity both in terms of scope and competence levels (Benito et al., 2003).  
In general, most countries now actively seek inward FDI. However, while the 
potential for MNE-related spillovers is clear, the nature, level and extent of the benefits 
vary considerably, and the outcomes from a FDI-assisted industrial policy are not always 
positive (Lall and Narula, 2004), and require considerable engagement by policy makers 
in developing human capital, infrastructure and creating the appropriate milieu to 
promote positive outcomes from FDI inflows. As Lorentzen (Chapter 7 in this volume) 
implies in his South African study, the quality of the location advantages and the extent 
to which spillovers occur from inward FDI are crucially interrelated.  
It is not always sufficiently acknowledged that inward FDI can also have negative 
effects. For instance, in many peripheral economies, increased FDI has had negative 
effects on competition. First, conventional ‘crowding out’ has occurred: as MNEs 
increase competitive pressure on the domestic sector, domestic firms that have been 
unable to face this pressure choose – if they at all survive – to de-skill the labour force 
and move to cheaper niches in the market. Those that survive, struggle to compete with 
foreign competitors (see Chapter 2 in this volume). Second, MNEs often acquire the most 
technologically competitive domestic firms. Thus, these firms can be regarded as also 
exiting, as ownership has been transferred from domestic to foreign.  
There is limited real movement of workers from the MNE sector to the domestic 
sector in the host country, due in part to the higher salaries paid by MNEs subsidiaries in 
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order to keep their qualified workers and prevent dissemination of their superior 
knowledge (Fosfuri et al., 2001).  In other cases, spillovers occur primarily between 
MNE affiliates and the domestic firms that they have acquired. MNEs tend to acquire  the 
most technologically competitive amongst the domestic firms, with the highest absorptive 
capacity prior to acquisition, they would be in the best position to benefit from spillovers 
(Narula and Marin 2005).  
The motive of investment and the structure of MNEs’ global configuration 
influence the extent to which subsidiaries are embedded, and the quality of spillovers. 
The fact that FDI activities do not always demonstrate significant spillovers to the 
economy at large indicates that not all FDI provides the same opportunities for spillovers 
and linkages. For instance, resource-exploiting investments (say, in mining) seek to 
provide unprocessed raw materials (a relatively low value adding activity) which act as 
inputs to other affiliates that may be located elsewhere. Resource-seeking FDI may 
employ a large workforce and be capital intensive, but the potential for spillovers to 
domestic firms may be small.  
While potentially important, FDI is not a sine qua non for economic development. 
MNEs and FDI may well lead to an increase in productivity and exports, but they do not 
necessarily result in increased competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased 
industrial capacity, which ultimately determines economic growth in the long run (Lall 
and Narula, 2004). To be sure, upgrading of technological capabilities of domestic firms 
can no longer be pursued in quite the same way in a globalising world. International 
competition is a given, and there can be no return to the infant industry model. 
Nonetheless, market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing 
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and promoting a proactive industrial policy (see Chapter 7 in this volume). Firms 
necessarily take a shorter term, profit maximising view because they are largely risk 
averse. FDI per se does not provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial 
sector exists which has the necessary technological capacity to profit from the 
externalities from MNE activity (Chapter 2 in this volume). This is well illustrated by the 
inability of many Asian countries which have relied on a passive FDI-dependent strategy 
to upgrade their industrial development. FDI, domestic capabilities and a domestic sector 
need to be concatenated and properly phased if positive results are to be achieved.  
 
Supra-national policy issues 
An important outcome of globalisation has been the increasingly blurred identity of the 
nation-state. On the one hand, countries remain sovereign and independent, while on the 
other hand, they are increasingly swayed by extra-national developments. At the same 
time, there are clearly defined characteristics and patterns that are history-dependent and 
idiosyncratic, such as areas of specialisation, technological competences, structure of 
markets, consumption patterns and culture. Government policies have to tread a thin line 
between responding to extra-national developments and to domestic priorities. This has 
led to what is best described as de facto economic integration. That is to say, unintended 
national-level economic integration has occurred, and this has gradually been 
acknowledged by de jure integration.  
The growing intensity of international production has followed a natural co-
evolutionary path with that of de facto economic integration, which in turn has been 
reinforced by de jure integration. Supra-national agreements such as the EU, NAFTA, 
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WTO have reinforced, accelerated and created standardised regulation for economic 
activity, acting as a virtuous circle with regards economic integration that had been 
occurring as a matter of course.  
While interdependence, de facto integration and economic growth allow countries 
to catch-up, there are a wider set of issues to do with reciprocity and being politically 
peripheral in the international arena. This is most obviously noted within supra-national 
organisations such as the WTO. Agreements such as SCM, TRIMs and TRIPS have 
severely limited the policy space for countries, as issues such as tariffs, subsidies, 
incentives, and so forth are decided in a supra-national arena. Malhotra (2006) argues that 
multilateral and bilateral investment agreements have dubious benefits since they restrict 
the policy autonomy of developing countries, and may increase transaction costs, while 
simultaneously increasing opportunity costs. 
As Helene Hoggen discusses in Chapter 10, peripheral economies are in an 
uneven bargaining position vis-à-vis the core economies. Despite the fact that the 
peripheral economies dominate the membership of the WTO in terms of sheer numbers, 
the political and economic clout of the EU and the US tends to give them the advantage, 
as they are able to skew the agenda in their own favour, in many cases using a 
proliferation of bilateral agreements with individual countries to overcome resistance to 
their proposed reforms. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
coalition was intended to create a united front on behalf of the peripheral economies in 
the WTO negotiations, but its failure to get concessions from the core economies for 
reciprocal access underlines the relative bargaining positions of the core and the 
periphery. 
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7. Overview of the book  
This book gives extensive treatments of pertinent aspects of being peripheral in an 
increasingly global economy. It starts with four studies of the outward 
internationalisation – by trade as well as investment – by firms from small and peripheral 
economies. 
Lou Anne Barclay examines the competitive strategies implemented by successful 
Trinidadian exporters in the context of a liberalised trading environment. Her starting 
point is that while developing countries have been liberalising their trade regimes since 
the end of the 1990s, it is uncertain whether such countries always benefit from trade 
liberalisation. The manufacturing sector of small, developing countries is especially 
vulnerable to the consequences of liberalised trade. Thus, the future viability of their 
local manufacturing firms is questionable. Her analysis suggests that many of the firms 
studied might not be able to compete in a liberalised trading environment. Indeed, the 
future viability of Trinidad’s manufacturing sector rests on the actions of both policy 
makers and firms.  
Ele Reiljan analyses the role of foreign owners in the internationalisation of 
manufacturing enterprises in Estonia, one of the small emerging economy in the Baltic. 
Foreign investors have a significant share in several branches of the Estonian 
manufacturing industry and therefore it is likely that they influence the development of 
these branches by dictating the rules not only in the Estonian market but also in 
determining the structure of the export markets, the share of foreign activities, 
commitment to the foreign markets, choice between subcontracting activities and own 
 32
export, and several other strategic issues that influence the overall pattern of foreign 
expansion. As Reiljan concludes that has had an impact on the sustainability of 
competitiveness of the Estonian enterprises and the whole economy. 
Grøgaard and Benito use data from Norway, a rich albeit small country in the 
Northern periphery of Europe, to investigate the role of industry factors as drivers of 
companies’ internationalisation. They argue that the bulk of literature on companies’ 
internationalisation has focused on firm-level and country-level factors in order to 
explain firms’ cross-border activities. With the exception of a limited number of studies 
looking at rivalistic behaviour in oligopolistic industries, industry factors have been 
neglected as potential important determinants of internationalisation. Specifically, 
Grøgaard and Benito look at whether differences across industries with regard to 
competition level, research intensity, tangibility of the products, and the existence of 
clusters influence the impetus and opportunities to internationalize. They use an extensive 
data set covering the internationalisation patterns of the 100 largest non-financial 
Norwegian companies over the period 1990 to 2000. The results suggest that industry 
factors contribute significantly to explaining the companies’ internationalisation, and that 
the effects of industry factors remain strong when firm-level characteristics are taken into 
account.  
In contrast to Gørgaard and Benito who focus on relatively large companies, the 
study by Siv Marina Karlsen describes the process of internationalisation of 12 small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Norway. Her study explores the factors that influence the 
pace of internationalisation, in particular why some firms gradually become international 
while others are “born global”. She finds that some high value-adding manufacturing 
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firms, in spite of their small size and lack of experience in international transactions, are 
capable of outrunning their larger, more resourceful counterparts in foreign markets. 
Firms originating from small countries seem to be more exposed to forces pushing them 
out: partly due to small domestic markets and partly due to fear of future competition 
from firms originating from larger countries. 
In the three subsequent chapters, the perspective is changed from an outward to an 
inward view of internationalisation. 
Ana Teresa Tavares examines the cases of two small open EU economies (Ireland 
and Portugal). These two countries in the EU periphery have had very different 
performances in their FDI attraction, both in terms of magnitude of FDI inflows and 
regarding the quality of multinationals’ operations. Based on a survey of more than 600 
foreign-owned subsidiaries in Portugal and Ireland, the study highlights issues related to 
the quality and scope of MNE subsidiaries’ activities, providing evidence on subsidiary 
strategic evolution, the motivations underlying investment, and characterising the 
qualitative dimensions linked to observed evolutionary processes. Tavares connects 
different subsidiary evolutionary paths to host country development impact. She looks at 
subsidiaries’ value-added scope and the density and quality of local linkages as key 
determinants of host country impact, and makes an explicit link between subsidiary 
evolution and public policy towards MNEs. The policy stances of the two host economies 
are compared, showing that Ireland was far more focused, consistent and effective in 
terms of promoting and sustaining high quality inward investment, leading to an expected 
greater ability to withstand future global challenges. 
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The chapter by Jochen Lorentzen presents a South African case study looking into 
the relationship between human capital in host economies and international capital 
inflows. Lorentzen’s study describes how DaimlerChrysler upgraded human resources in 
the area around its East London plant in one of South Africa’s least developed provinces 
where the company manufactures the Mercedes C-Class model for export. It shows the 
extent and depth of the upgrading along and beyond the automotive supply chain, and its 
repercussions on local education and training institutions. It also analyses how and why 
this virtuous interaction between FDI and local industrial development in the short and 
medium term may in the absence of proper regional economic planning turn into a much 
less desirable outcome in the longer term. 
 Björn and Tina Ambos look at corporate R&D, traditionally one of the most 
protected and most centralised activities in companies, but which has experienced a rapid 
internationalisation over the 10-15 years. In contrast to earlier studies, which have 
focused on R&D activities in core Triad countries, their study also provides novel 
insights about R&D units in non-Triad nations. The study, which builds on survey data 
from 49 leading German MNEs that collectively account for two-thirds of the country’s 
privately funded R&D expenditures, reveals some interesting patterns. An important 
finding is that units in Triad as well as peripheral locations are increasingly equipped 
with global market mandates, which indicates that the times where R&D was simply 
carried out for local markets are over. However, despite a steady growth of inward 
investment, it seems that non-Triad nations are unable to catch-up with the core. The 
study also shows that the MNEs manage their units in peripheral and in core countries in 
different ways: units in peripheral locations display much higher interdependencies with 
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corporate headquarters, are granted much less autonomy, and are much less innovative 
(measured by patents per annum) than units in core locations.  
Whereas previous chapters focus either at local firms’ outward 
internationalisation or at foreign firms’ entry and subsequent development of operations 
in a country, the chapter by Carl Arthur Solberg looks at both domestic and foreign 
companies in his study of relocation. He proposes a model for analysing relocation of 
business activities, with a focus on three groups of factors: country, industry cluster and 
company factors. His study of the Norwegian offshore supply sector indicates that 
country and internal company factors are particularly important in explaining firms’ 
relocation of business activities. However, the strength of cluster factors does not seem to 
play any significant direct role in this context. His findings also indicate that there is no 
difference between local and foreign firms in their proclivity to relocate.  
In the final chapter, Helene Hoggen takes the level of analysis up from that of 
firms and industries to that of countries and their relationships. Looking at the WTO, she 
argues that formal rules and dispute settlement cases are not precise indicators of which 
member states’ companies benefit from the WTO system. It is also debatable whether the 
system is beneficial first and foremost for industry or whether it protects consumers – in 
peripheral as well as central WTO member states. She argues that it is important to 
observe ongoing negotiations continuously in order to determine ‘who gets what and 
how’. The WTO is a very special organisation and the trade rules laid down in the WTO 
agreements are continuously being renegotiated. The WTO system is more complex than 
it may seem at first glance and traditional rationalist perspectives are not necessarily the 
best equipped to explain WTO dynamics. In essence, her chapter deals with the challenge 
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of being a country or a company in the periphery of the WTO system, as compared to 
being a central actor in the WTO. Her analysis suggests that while coercion is a viable 
weapon of the strong, principled argument can be a potent asset for the weak to bring 
about desired change.  
 37
References  
 
Barnard, H. (2006) Investment from less to more developed countries as a mechanism for  
capability upgrading in developing country firms, Unpublished PhD Dissertation,  
Newark: Rutgers University. 
Bellak, C. and Cantwell, J. (1997) ‘Small latecomer countries in a globalising  
environment: constraints and opportunities for catching-up’, Development and  
International Cooperation, 13: 139-179. 
Benito, G.R.G. (2005) ‘Divestment and international business strategy’, Journal of 
Economic Geography, 5: 235-251. 
Benito, G. R.G., Larimo, J., Narula, R. and Pedersen, T. (2002) ‘Multinational enterprises  
from small economies: internationalisation patterns of large companies from Denmark,  
Finland, and Norway’, International Studies of Management and Organization, 32(1): 
57-78. 
Benito, G.R.G., Grøgaard, B. and R. Narula (2003), ‘Environmental influences on MNE  
subsidiary roles: Economic integration and the Nordic countries’, Journal of  
International Business Studies, 34 (5): 443-456.  
Birkinshaw, J. and N. Hood (1998), editors, Multinational Corporate Evolution and  
Subsidiary Development. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Cantwell, J. (1995) ‘The globalization of technology: What remains of the product  
cycle model?’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19: 155-74. 
Dicken, P. (2003), Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st  
Century. Fourth Edition. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Dunning, J.H. and Narula, R. and Van Hoesel, R. (1998). ‘Third world multinationals  
revisited:  New developments and theoretical implications’. In Dunning, J.H. (ed)  
Globalisation, trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford: Elsevier. 
Forslid, R. and Wooton, I. (2003) ‘Comparative advantage and the location of  
Production’, Review of International Economics, 11 (4): 588-603. 
Fosfuri, A., Motta, M. and Ronde, T. (2001) ‘Foreign direct investment and spillovers  
through workers' mobility’, Journal of International Economics, 53 (1): 205-222. 
Fujita, M. and Thisse, J. (2003) ‘Does geographical agglomeration foster economic  
 38
growth? And who gains and loses from it?’, Japanese Economic Review, 54 (2):121-145. 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations.  
Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hoesel, R. van (1999) New Multinational Enterprises from Korea and Taiwan, London:  
Routledge. 
Hoesel, R. van and Narula, R. (1999), editors, Multinationals from the Netherlands. 
London: Routledge. 
Holm, U. and T. Pedersen (2000), editors, The Emergence and Impact of MNC Centres of  
Excellence. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Kottaridi, C. (2005) ‘The ‘core-periphery’ pattern of FDI-led growth and production  
Structure’, Applied Economics, 37: 99-113. 
Krugman, P. (1991) Geography and Trade. Leuven University Press/MIT Press 
Krugman, P.  and Venables, A. (1995). ‘Globalization and the inequality of nations’,  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4): 857-80. 
Kumar, K and Mcleod, G, (1981), editors, Multinationals from Developing Countries.  
Lexington Books. 
Lall, S. (1983) Third World Multinationals. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Lall, S. and Narula, R. (2004) ‘FDI and its role in economic development: Do we need a  
new agenda?’, European Journal of Development Research, 16: 447–464. 
Lecraw, D. (1977) ‘Direct investment by firms from less developed countries’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 29 (3): 442-457. 
Malhotra, K. (2006) ‘Will a trade and investment link in the global trade regime be good 
for human development?’. In Narula R and. Lall, S. (eds.) Understanding FDI-Assisted 
Economic Development. Routledge, London. 
Marshall, A. (1919) Industry and Trade; A Study of Industrial Technique and Business  
Organization, and of their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes and Nations. 
London: Macmillan. 
Mathews, J. (2006) ‘Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century  
globalization’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23: 139-141. 
Narula, R. (2003) Globalisation and Technology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Narula, R. and Dunning, J. (2000) ‘Industrial development, globalisation and  
 39
multinational enterprises: New realities for developing countries’, Oxford Development  
Studies, 28: 141-167. 
Narula, R. and Marin, A. (2005). Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect 
spillovers from FDI in Argentina, MERIT Research Memorandum 2005-16 
Navaretti, G.B. and Venables, A.J. (2004). Multinational Firms in the World Economy.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Prebisch, R. (1962) The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal  
Problems. New York: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2005) World Investment Report 2005, Geneva: United Nations.  
UNCTAD (2006) World Investment Report 2006, Geneva: United Nations. 
Van Den Bulcke, D. and Verbeke, A. (2001), editors, Globalization and the Small Open  
Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Vernon, R. (1966) ‘International investment and international trade in the product cycle,, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80: 190-207  
Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins  
of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. 
Wallerstein, I. (1979) The Capitalist World Economy: Essays. Cambridge University  
Press: Cambridge. 
 
 
 
 40
 
Figure 1.1: Core and periphery in the world economy. 
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Figure 1.2:  Different types of subsidiaries (Source: Benito et al., 2003). 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1 Cantwell (1995) generalises Vernon’s ideas, extending them to include multiple core locations, and the 
role of technological change in this process. 
2 The issue here is to seek access to markets, which firms may do either through exports or FDI. 
